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The veil of ignorance has been used often as a tool for recommending
what justice requires with respect to the distribution of wealth. We
complete Harsanyi’s model of the veil of ignorance by appending in-
formation permitting interpersonal comparability of welfare. We show
that the veil-of-ignorance conception of John Harsanyi, so completed,
and Ronald Dworkin’s, when modeled formally, recommend wealth
allocations in conﬂi c tw i t ht h ep r o m i n e n t l ye s p o u s e dv i e wt h a tp r i o r -
ity should be given to the worse oﬀ with respect to wealth allocation.
(JEL numbers: D63, D71).
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11 Introduction
The construct of the veil of ignorance has been of signiﬁcant import in po-
litical philosophy during the last half century: three prominent writers—John
Harsanyi, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin—have employed it in diﬀerent
forms. Although these three disagree on exactly how thick the veil should
be, each uses it as a tool to enforce impartiality in the procedure that de-
duces what the worldly distribution of resources or wealth should be. The
veil-of-ignorance model is putatively impartial because the ‘soul’ or ‘souls’ or
‘parties’ or ‘observer’ who contemplate(s) behind the veil are (is) deprived of
precisely that information that the author deems to be morally arbitrary, to
use the phrase of Rawlsian parlance.
From quite a diﬀerent vantage point, another group of political philoso-
phers (which has a non-empty intersection with the ﬁr s tg r o u p )h a sb e e n
concerned to argue that justice requires that priority be given to the worse
oﬀ in the allocation of wealth. The most extreme form of priority is advo-
cated by Rawls, for whom diﬀerences in amounts of primary goods (wealth
among them) accruing to people are only morally permissible if they maxi-
mize the level of (or index of) primary goods accruing to the worst oﬀ (that
is, she who is least endowed with primary goods). Rawls (1971) attempts,
unsuccessfully in our view, to argue for this principle using a veil-of-ignorance
(original position) construction.1
The diﬀerence principle has often been criticized as being too extreme,
and Derek Parﬁt (1997) has coined the term prioritarianism for the view
that the ‘worse oﬀ’ should be given priority over the ‘better oﬀ’ with respect
to resource allocation, but that the former need not necessarily receive the
extreme priority that characterizes maximin (the diﬀerence principle). In a
welfarist setting, prioritarianism is usually characterized as a social welfare
function with strictly convex upper contour sets. The boundaries of priori-
tarianism are maximin on one side, and utilitarianism on the other. (See, for
1See Roemer (1996) for one discussion of the inadequacy of Rawls’s argument from the
original position.
2example, Roemer, 2004).
Other philosophers who would identify themselves with either a prioritar-
ian or egalitarian or maximin view include Brian Barry (1989, 1995), G.A.
Cohen (1992), Larry Temkin (1993), and Thomas Scanlon (1998). There
are surely many more. We include together the three views here italicized
because prioritarianism is a weakening of egalitarianism and the diﬀerence
principle: if a rule is egalitarian or maximin it is surely prioritarian.2 Those
who advocate priority but not maximin do so usually because they consider
the sacriﬁces of implementing the diﬀerence principle too great—sacriﬁces
borne by the better oﬀ.
In this paper, we show that the veil of ignorance, when formulated in a
rigorous way, is inconsistent with prioritarianism: to be precise, it will often
recommend distributions of wealth that give priority to the better oﬀ.3 We
focus on the conceptions of the veil of ignorance outlined by Harsanyi (1953,
1977) and Dworkin (1981b). In the former case, we complete the theory that
Harsanyi began and then show its anti-prioritarian consequences. In the
latter case, we show the anti-prioritarian nature of a simple model reﬂecting
Dworkin’s insurance mechanism.
T h ec o n c e p to fo n ep e r s o n ’ sb e i n gw o r s eo ﬀ than another is one, in the
philosophical literature, which presupposes the possibility of making inter-
personal welfare comparisons. Therefore, such comparisons will be assumed
to be possible in our formulation of the problem. To anticipate what we
deﬁne in what follows, we will say that one person is worse oﬀ, or less able,
than another if the ﬁrst transforms resources (for us, ‘wealth’) into welfare
less eﬃciently than the other.
2One could argue that egalitarianism does not imply priority, in the sense that (2,2) is
more egalitarian than (3,4),b u tt h ew o r s eo ﬀ person is better oﬀ in the second allocation
than in the ﬁrst. Thus priority could recommend (3,4) but equality (2,2). One could,
however, also argue that in (2,2) the ﬁrst person is given greater priority than in (3,4).
We pursue this no further.
3An early form of this work is available in Roemer (2002); that article has an error,
which is corrected here.
3There is a recent literature which also is concerned with completing
Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance approach (Karni, 1998, 2003; Dhillon and Mertens,
1999; and Segal, 2000).4 In the conclusion, we brieﬂy contrast our approach
to this literature.
2 The Harsanyi veil of ignorance
2.1 Harsanyi’s original ﬁrst step
In 1953, John Harsanyi proposed the ﬁrst precise model of the veil of ig-
norance.5 Suppose there are n individuals, each of whom possesses von
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preferences over wealth lotteries. Denote the
vNM utility functions on wealth for these people by v1,v 2,...,vn.T h e r ei sa n
amount of wealth W to be divided among them. What is the just division?
Harsanyi proposes to conceptualize a single impartial observer (IO) who will
become one of these people, with equal probability of becoming each one.
How would such an observer allocate the wealth?
The IO’s data, for Harsanyi, consist of the set {v1,v 2,...,vn,W}.
Denote by (i,W) the extended prospect that means ‘becoming person i
with wealth W.’ Harsanyi proposes that the IO, to solve his problem, must
itself possess a vNM utility function U deﬁned on extended prospects. (That
i s ,i tm u s tb ea b l et oe v a l u a t el o t t e r i e so ne x t e n d e dp r o s p e c t s . ) W ec a n
then represent the ‘birth lottery’ through which the IO becomes a particular


















This is to be read, “With probability 1/n, the extended prospect (1,W1)
is realized (and the IO becomes person 1 with wealth W1), with probability
4We thank a referee for alerting us to the connections between our work and this
literature.
5See Harsanyi (1977) or Weymark (1989) for a more detailed presentation of this model.
41/n the extended prospect (2,W2) is realized, and so on”. Now the utility








and so the IO needs only ﬁnd the distribution of wealth that maximizes
expression (1) subject to the constraint that
P
Wi = W. That distribution
is the one it would choose, and therefore, that justice recommends.
The problem, then, is to deduce what the function U is. Harsanyi takes
a na x i o m a t i ca p p r o a c ht ot h i sp r o b l e m .H ea s s u m e sw h a th ec a l l s :
The Principle of Acceptance:F o r e a c h ﬁxed i ∈ {1,...,n},t h ef u n c -
tion U(i,·) represents the same vNM preferences on wealth lotteries as vi(·)
represents.
Now the vNM theorem tells us that any two vNM utility functions that
represent the same preferences must be positive aﬃne transformations of each
other. Therefore:







































Maximizing the right-hand side of (3) is equivalent to maximizing
P
ai ·
vi(Wi). That is the end of Harsanyi’s argument: the IO must maximize some
positive weighted sum of the vNM utilities of the individual persons.
2.2 Amending Harsanyi’s ﬁrst step to allow for inter-
personal comparisons of welfare
Harsanyi’s argument is in our view unﬁnished, for he has provided no well-
argued way of determining the values of the positive numbers {ai : i =
51,2,...n}, so he has not determined the vNM preferences of the IO.6 Fur-
thermore, there is no way to derive these values from the information that
Harsanyi has provided to the IO, and his axioms.
Am o m e n t ’ st h o u g h tw i l ls h o ww h yt h i si ss o .T h eo n l yi n f o r m a t i o nt h eI O
has, consists in the proﬁle of risk preferences of the individuals, and the total
wealth to be allocated. But to decide whether it would rather become Alan
with $1000 or Barbara with $3000,t h eI Omust be able to compare how well
oﬀ Alan is with $1000 with how well oﬀ Barbara is with $3000. (Or it must
have some independent reason to prefer to be Alan, say.) There is no way the
IO can make such comparisons with the information Harsanyi has given it.
There is, in Harsanyi’s speciﬁcation of the problem, absolutely no information
permitting interpersonal welfare comparisons. The vNM preferences of the
individuals are purely ordinal preferences that measure ‘utility’ in a non-
comparable way across persons.7
Clearly, if the IO were to possess vNM preferences on the lotteries on
the space of extended prospects, such preferences would imply the existence
of something that looks like an interpersonal welfare ordering, for the IO.
For let such preferences exist and denote them by %;t h e nt h es t a t e m e n t
“(i,W) % (j,W 0)” which means “the IO would weakly prefer to be person i
with wealth W to being person j with wealth W0”i ssimilar, though surely
not identical, to the statement “person i with wealth W is at least as well
oﬀ as person j with wealth W0.” Of course, the second statement presup-
poses that interpersonal comparisons of welfare are meaningful, while the
6Indeed, Harsanyi asserts that the weights of individual vNM utilities must be equal
to reﬂect impartiality. We reject this view: if a preference relation is represented by a
weighted sum of individual utilities, then there is a feasible manipulation of the individual
utility functions that leads to a new representation of the preference relation as a weighted
sum of individual utilities with equal weights.
7Many people are confused about this claim. VNM preferences are ordinal preferences
on lotteries. There happens to be a very useful cardinal representation of those preferences,
which allows us to calculate the utility of a lottery in a very simple way (by factoring out
the probabilities). But the preferences are purely ordinal and non-comparable across
persons. For further discussion, see Roemer (1996, chapter 4).
6ﬁrst statement does not: in the absence of the ability to make such compar-
i s o n st h eI Om i g h th a v ea n o t h e rd e c i s i o np r o c e d u r ew h i c hl e a d si tt oi t sv i e w
about the relative merits of being person i or j with the associated wealths.
Our proposal is simple: we will amend Harsanyi’s model by assuming that
it is possible to perform interpersonal welfare comparisons. To this end, we
assume that
There is a complete order on extended prospects,d e n o t e dR,a n df o r
all i,j,W there exists W0 such that (i,W)I(j,W0),w h e r eI denotes the
symmetric part of the order R.
The statement (1,W1)R(2,W2) means ‘person 1 with wealth W1 is at
least as well oﬀ as person 2 with wealth W2’. This order is to be thought
of as a fact about the world, a statement about how the persons experience
life: it is not —yet— the subjective preference order of the IO.
We now append an axiom concerning the relationship between the IO’s
ordering of extended prospects and the interpersonal ordering R,t h a tw e
name:
The Principle of Neutrality: (i,W i) % (j,W j) ⇔ (i,W i)R(j,W j).
In other words, the IO weakly prefers one extended prospect to another if
and only if the person in the ﬁrst extended prospect is at least as well-oﬀ (in
terms of the interpersonally comparable coin called welfare or well-being) as
the person in the second extended prospect. We call this ‘neutrality’ because
it asserts that the IO brings no external considerations to bear concerning
what person it would like to become: it only follows the dictates of the
interpersonally comparable attribute called welfare or well-being, ignoring
all other traits these individuals have (such as their sex, race, nationality,
religious preference, or political views).8
8It is worth noting that our proposal, similar that might appear, does not follow the
so-called extended preference approach, formally elaborated by Arrow (1963, 1977), Suppes
(1966), Sen (1970), Kolm (1972), Suzumura (1983) and Mongin (2001) among others. This
approach endows each member of the society with both an actual preference relation de-
ﬁned on the set of allocations (social states), and a relation deﬁn e do ne x t e n d e dp r o s p e c t s .
7We view the principle of neutrality as a principle of impartiality as well,
for the reason stated above. Neutrality, that is, is a kind of impartiality.
Of course, because information on the sex, race, religion, etc., of individuals
is unavailable in our speciﬁcation of the data of the problem, it is hard to
see what partiality could mean on these environments —that is, given only
the above data, the IO must necessarily ignore these other attributes of
individuals in the world. Nevertheless, partiality could mean that the IO
w o u l dp r e f e rt ob er e a l i z e da so n ep e r s o ni over another person j because he
likes to have the risk preferences of i more than having the risk preferences of
j. The principle of neutrality excludes that kind of partiality: for it requires
the IO to choose between extended prospects only on the basis of the welfare
he would experience in them.
2.2.1 An impossibility result
T h ed a t aa v a i l a b l et ot h eI Oa r en o w{v1,v2,...,vn,W,R},a n dt h eaxioms
that relate his own preference order to the data are those of Acceptance and
Neutrality. We will now show that these data and axioms together lead to
an impossibility theorem.









a) for every pair i,j,
where I is the symmetric part of the order R. Let there be two more equal-




i=1,a n ds u p p o s e
that these three distributions of wealth represent three welfare levels in in-




because we assume that welfare is strictly increasing in wealth.
We again invoke the vNM theorem, which tells us that for each person i
In our approach, individuals posses preferences over wealth lotteries but not over extended
prospects. The IO is the one possessing preferences over extended prospects.













In general, of course, the probabilities pi will diﬀer across individuals.
The more risk averse an individual is, the lower will pi be. We say that:
The individuals in the world {v1,v 2,...,vn,W,R} are risk isomorphic if,




the numbers {pi : i =1 ,...,n} deﬁned by (4) are identical for all i =1 ,...,n.
What this means is that these individuals have identical risk preferences
over welfare lotteries, where welfare is the coin of interpersonal comparability.
Risk isomorphism is a property of our environments: it requires as data
boththeproﬁle of vNM preferences and the interpersonal ordering R. Clearly,
it is a singular case, which will rarely if ever hold in ‘real worlds.’
We have the following:
Theorem 1 There is a vNM preference order on extended prospects (for
the IO) that satisﬁes the principles of acceptance and neutrality if and only
if individuals in the world {v1,v 2,...,vn,W,R} a r er i s ki s o m o r p h i c . I fs o ,

















Theorem 1 is basically an impossibility theorem. It says that, in what
is the usual case (of risk non-isomorphism), the Harsanyi veil of ignorance,
9This is a correction of the stated theorem in Roemer (2002). I (Roemer) there incor-
rectly assumed something that implied that all environments were risk isomorphic, and
so I claimed that the principles of neutrality and acceptance always characterized unique
vNM preferences for the IO. Fortunately, the examples of that paper are correct, as they
are all examples where risk isomorphism holds.
9amended by information on interpersonal comparability and the principle
of neutrality, is an incoherent thought experiment. In the singular case of
risk-isomorphism, we uniquely determine the preferences of the IO (that
is, we solve for the coeﬃcients {ai} of equation (3).) In particular, if the
environment is risk isomorphic, we know the basic procedure by which the
IO selects the allocation of wealth. Formally,




i=1 be any two equal-welfare distri-
b u t i o n so fw e a l t hs u c ht h a tWi
b >W i
a. If individuals in the world {v1,v2,...,vn,W,R}













subject to the condition that
Pn
i=1 Wi = W.
2.2.2 Deep imaginative empathy
Theorem 1 shows that in the risk non-isomorphism case, there are no vNM
preferences for the IO. However, we can propose a procedure by which the IO
might decide upon a distribution of wealth in any (risk-isomorphic or not)
environment. This procedure uses an idea that Harsanyi (1977, page 51)
refers to as ‘imaginative empathy’.
Denote the individuals by 1,2,...,n.T h eI Oﬁrst ‘steps in the shoes’ of
any person i, and chooses the wealth distribution i would choose, if i always
converts wealth given to other people into the welfare-equivalent wealth for
herself (i). We deﬁne this precisely as follows. For any pair (j,W) and any
agent i deﬁne σi
j(W) by (j,W j)I(i,σi
j(W)).T h a t i s , σi
j(W) is the wealth
that i requires to reach the same level of welfare as j achieves with wealth
Wj. If the distribution of wealth being contemplated is (W1,W2,...,W n)











10Thus the IO, using i’s risk preferences, asks how she would feel as any
person j, given the wealth j gets in the distribution: to do so, the IO must
convert j’s wealth to the welfare—equivalent wealth for i,s i n c et h eI Oi s
evaluating everything from i’s perspective.
Harsanyi used the phrase imaginative empathy for the compassion the
IO feels as it contemplates taking on the risk preferences of diﬀerent people.
But, since Harsanyi did not deal with interpersonal comparisons of welfare,
his imaginative empathy referred to the IO’s taking on only the risk pref-
erences of diﬀerent people, as modeled by his Principle of Acceptance. The
formulation (7) is one we call deep imaginative empathy, because, when step-
ping in the shoes of person i, the IO takes on not only i’s risk preferences,
but imagines how i would feel in terms of welfare if he (i)w e r et ob er e a l i z e d
as any person j with a given wealth level Wj.P e r s o ni would experience j’s
wealth level Wj, which is equivalent to i’s having the wealth level σi
j(Wj).
Denote by ωi =( W1
i ,...,W n
i ) a feasible distribution of wealth that max-
imizes expression (7) subject to the condition that
Pn
k=1 Wk
i = W.S e -
quentially, the IO now performs this computation, taking on every person’s
viewpoint. This produces n wealth distributions ω1,...,ωn.W ep r o p o s et h a t
the IO takes the average of these distributions, 1
n ·
P
ωi, as its recommended
distribution.10 Formally:









where, for all i =1 ,...,n, ωi =( W1
i ,...,W n
i ) is an allocation that maximizes




Note that the general procedure just described provides a choice corre-
spondence for the IO: to any environment {v1,v 2,...,vn,W,R} it associates
a (not necessarily singleton) set of distributions of wealth. So does the basic
procedure described in (6), when the environment is risk isomorphic. The
10Indeed, as we will see in the proof of Theorem 2, the IO can take any convex combi-
nation of these wealth distributions.
11general procedure, however, can be performed for any environment, risk iso-
morphic or not. The next result shows that it is a generalization of the
basic procedure: that is, if the environment is risk-isomorphic, the general
procedure selects the allocations obtained maximizing the IO’s vNM utility
function provided in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 If individuals in the world {v1,v2,...,vn,W,R} are risk isomor-
phic, then the following statements hold:
(i) If the basic procedure yields a unique allocation of wealth then the
general procedure yields the same allocation.
(ii) If the basic procedure yields more than one allocation of wealth, and
all the vi functions are concave, then the general procedure yields the same
s e to fa l l o c a t i o n s .
2.3 The anti-prioritarian nature of the Harsanyi veil
of ignorance
We now show the anti-prioritarian nature of the Harsanyi veil of ignorance
by means of a simple example. There are two individuals, Andrea and Bob.
They are each risk neutral. We may therefore take them to have the same




Let us suppose that the interpersonal welfare order is given by (Andrea,W)I(Bob,2W);
that is, Bob always needs twice the wealth of Andrea to achieve the same
welfare level as she. It is easy to see that this environment is risk isomorphic.
We now compute what the IO recommends for this example. Suppose that
W =1 , so a distribution of wealth is represented by (W,1 − W) where the
ﬁrst component goes to Andrea and the second to Bob. The IO must choose
W.W ek n o wt h a tU(A,W)=U(B,2W) by the principle of neutrality. Now



































which is achieved at W =1 : the IO would give all the wealth to Andrea.
Now in this environment, we consider Bob to be disabled with respect
to Andrea: he requires more wealth than she to receive any given level of
welfare. Thus, the Harsanyi veil of ignorance gives all the wealth to the able
person. If we consider more than two individuals in this example, and they
can be ordered with respect to ‘ability’, then the Harsanyi veil of ignorance
assigns all the wealth to the most able individual(s).
What happens if we alter the risk preferences in the above Andrea-Bob
example so that the individuals are risk averse? For small degrees of risk
aversion, it continues to be the case that our amended Harsanyi veil delivers
more wealth to the able agent, although it will deliver some wealth to both
agents. Only for large degrees of risk aversion does the veil of ignorance assign
more wealth to the disabled person. Therefore, our example has shown that
the veil of ignorance, in general, violates priority. Note that, by Theorem 2,
it follows that the general procedure is also anti-prioritarian, because in the
special case of risk-isomorphism, we know it is anti-prioritarian.
Of course, the interpretation matters here. A situation where Bob re-
quires twice Andrea’s wealth to reach her level of welfare could also be due
to Bob’s having expensive tastes for which we hold him responsible, and in
that case, we might not be so disturbed by the conclusion.11 But we insist
that that is not the problem we are here studying. We are discussing worlds
where people diﬀer in their ability to convert wealth into well-being, through
no fault of their own.
11The issue of expensive tastes is focal in the contemporary literature on distributive
justice: see, for the locus classicus, Dworkin (1981a).
13We now assert that priority requires that disabled individuals receive at
l e a s ta sm u c hw e a l t ha sa b l eo n e s .That is our deﬁnition of priority for these
worlds. In the environments under discussion, we have a clear way of deciding
what it means to say ‘i is worse oﬀ than j’i nt h es e n s eo fP a r ﬁt: it means
that i is disabled relative to j,w h i c hm e a n s‘ i requires more wealth than j
to reach any given welfare level’.
We have now provided the argument that the veil of ignorance, completed
from Harsanyi’s ﬁrst step by the addition of more information and a new
axiom, is anti-prioritarian, in the sense that it fails in general to assign at
least as much wealth to disabled agents as to able ones. Although Harsanyi’s
assumption that the IO must possess vNM preferences is, we believe, too
strong —in the sense that it is inconsistent with the very reasonable axioms
of acceptance and neutrality on our domain of problems, except in a singular
case— we have produced a proposal for what the IO should do in the general
case (of non-risk-isomorphism), and it also is anti-prioritarian.12
3 The Dworkin veil of ignorance
Ronald Dworkin (1981b) outlined a conception of the veil of ignorance that
is coherent and can be formally modeled. In Dworkin’s view, individuals are
to be held responsible for their preferences, but not for their ‘resources.’ The
veil of ignorance is supposed to shield people from knowledge of the charac-
teristics they possess which are ‘morally arbitrary’ —here, their resources— but
not from characteristics which they ‘own’ —here, their preferences. Thus, be-
hind Dworkin’s veil, the soul representing a person knows his person’s vNM
12One might try to defend Harsanyi’s veil of ignorance and prioritarianism by saying
that, when such monumental issues are at stake as one’s wealth for a lifetime, rational
individuals would be highly risk averse, thus excluding from the domain of possible worlds,
proﬁles of risk preferences which generate the conﬂict with priority. We are skeptical. Real
people frequently take life-threatening risks that indicate that they do not have excessively
high degrees of risk aversion. It is unappealing to say that the only rational persons are
t h eo n e sw h oa r ee x t r e m e l yr i s ka v e r s e .
14preferences, but does not know the worldly wealth or the ability his person
has. Dworkin’s innovation was to propose that souls behind this veil of ig-
norance enter into insurance contracts with each other, to seek indemnity
against bad luck in the birth lottery. In this section, we propose a model of
this insurance market.
Here we again present a two-person example, and our model of Dworkin’s
thought experiment. Suppose we again have Andrea and Bob, and Bob is
disabled with respect to Andrea—to wit, he requires 2W in wealth to reach
the same welfare level as Andrea reaches with W. For the sake of variety, we
will now suppose that Andrea and Bob have the same risk preferences over




This time, Andrea and Bob are risk averse.
As we said, Dworkin wishes to hold persons responsible for their risk
preferences, but not for their talents. In this case, talent is the ability to
convert wealth into welfare. Thus, behind the veil of ignorance he constructs,
the soul representing a person knows its person’s vNM utility function, but
does not know its person’s talent.
Behind the veil of ignorance, there are two souls—call them α and β—
who represent Andrea and Bob, respectively. Each soul knows the welfare
producing capacities of Andrea and Bob, and each believes that it will become
Andrea or Bob with equal probability (or, to paraphrase, that it will acquire
Andrea’s and Bob’s talent with equal probability).
Thus there are two states of the world, from the viewpoint behind the
veil, as follows:
State α becomes β becomes
1 Andrea Bob
2 Bob Andrea
In state 1, soul α becomes Andrea and soul β becomes Bob; in state 2,
the assignments of souls to persons are the other way around. We know
15that state 1 will occur, but the souls behind the veil assign a probability of
one-half to each state’s occurring.
We assume that, in the real world, Andrea has an endowment WA of
wealth and Bob has an endowment of WB.
Behind the veil, the souls purchase insurance against bad luck in the
birth lottery. We assume (after Dworkin) that the souls have equal pur-
chasing power for insurance. This is where equality enters importantly into
Dworkin’s view. It does not matter how much purchasing power they each
have: we shall say each has zero initially. This means that the only way
to purchase insurance for indemnity in one state is to sell insurance for the
other’s indemnity in the other state.
We model the insurance market as follows. There are two commodities:
the ﬁrst is a contract which will deliver $1 to the holder should state 1 occur,
and the second is a contract which will deliver $1 to the holder should state
2 occur. Let us denote the prices (behind the veil) for these two commodities
by p1 and p2. Note that these commodities are purchased behind the veil,




2 the amount of commodity 1 and commodity 2,
respectively, that soul α purchases. If x is positive, that means she purchases
contracts that will deliver to her x dollars if the state of the subscript occurs;
if x is negative, that means she will deliver x dollars to someone else should








which means that the amount of commodity 1 she can purchase must cost
exactly the income she generates by selling commodity 2 (or, the other
way around). This constraint derives from the fact that her endowment
of ‘clamshells’ behind the veil is zero. If the soul faces prices (p1,p 2) then




















2 =0 .( 1 0 )
16The objective she maximizes is her expected utility, but to understand
i t ,w em u s ta g a i ni n v o k et h en o t i o no fd e e pi m a g i n a t i v ee m p a t h y . T h ee x -
pression under the ﬁrst radical is clear: this is what her wealth will be if
she becomes Andrea (state 1). The expression under the second radical is
trickier. In state 2, she (the soul α) becomes Bob; the wealth she would then
have is WB + xα
2. However, she must evaluate this wealth from Andrea’s
viewpoint—and by hypothesis the welfare this amount of wealth generates for
Bob is exactly the welfare that one-half this amount generates for Andrea.
So deep imaginative empathy gives us the objective in (10).
In other words, soul α uses Andrea’s vNM utility function to evaluate
lotteries over wealth, and she converts wealth that she would experience as
Bob into welfare-equivalent wealth, for Andrea. The similarity to our general
procedure in the last section should be clear.
























Note that, if soul β b e c o m e sA n d r e a ,h em u s te v a l u a t eh e rw e a l t hi nt e r m s
of the welfare-equivalent wealth for Bob.
An equilibrium in the insurance market consists in:
(1) a pair of prices p1 and p2,a n d






1) such that the markets for both































13To be precise, the demands and supplies are uniquely determined. The prices can be
any pair of equal positive numbers.
17As we said, we know that, in the event, state 1 occurs; this means that the





















Thus, disabled Bob ends up with one-third of the total wealth, and able
Andrea ends up with two-thirds of the total wealth.
In other words, the Dworkinian insurance market is in general anti-
prioritarian. It does not (in general) assign at least as much wealth to the
disabled individual as to the able individual.
This section and the last one do not prove that all veil-of-ignorance models
are necessarily anti-prioritarian: we have established, however, that the two
most coherent proposals in the philosophical literature for conceptualizing the
veil of ignorance are so, at least under what we consider to be a reasonable
addition to those models, namely, information on interpersonal comparability
of welfare. Without such comparability, the notion of priority cannot be
deﬁned.
4 Discussion
We are concerned with the following syllogism:
A .J u s t i c er e q u i r e si m p a r t i a l i t y ;
B .I m p a r t i a l i t y ,a sf a ra sj u s t i c ei sc o n c e r n e d ,i sp r o p e r l ym o d e l e db y
veil-of-ignorance thought experiments;
C. Veil-of-ignorance thought experiments in general recommend anti-
prioritarian allocations.
Therefore,
D. Justice is not prioritarian.
A has a long intellectual history; it is an axiom we do not challenge. C is,
so far as we can tell, a fact about veil-of-ignorance models. We have tried to
convince the reader of its validity in this paper. We believe that the ethical
18statement D is invalid: we hold that justice is prioritarian. We therefore
must reject the premise B.
Those who reject D could avail themselves of alternatives to rejecting B,
such as:
1. Constructing a model of the veil of ignorance that does not conﬂict
with prioritarianism, thus negating C. Perhaps this can be done. Our
approach has been to formalize two of the best models of the veil of
ignorance oﬀered in the last half century and to show they are anti-
prioritarian.14 B u tt h i si sn o taproof that C is true.
2. Reﬁning the deﬁnition of impartiality to exclude the veil of ignorance.
Perhaps this can be done. We take this to be the strategy of Brian Barry
(1989, 1995)—how else could he claim that justice is (or as) impartiality,
and also believe that justice is prioritarian or more? Perhaps this is
also Scanlon’s (1998) strategy: we leave this for others to judge.
There is also the possibility of:
3. Admitting that a second principle, besides impartiality, is required to
characterize justice —examples are solidarity, fraternity or reciprocity—
and then to argue that impartiality, in conjunction with the new princi-
ple, excludes anti-prioritarian allocation rules, like the veil of ignorance.
Approach #3 would be one way of elaborating the rejection of premise B
above.
In part 2 of this research project, we do not carry out either strategy 2
or 3 above, desirable as they may be, but rather do something else, which
we view as important: we explore what allocation rules are consistent with
impartiality, priority, and a third principle, solidarity, on a space of important
allocation problems.15 Indeed, we characterize such rules.
14We have not studied Binmore’s (1994) formulation of the veil. Rawls’ (1971) proposal
has many problems, which we discuss elsewhere (e.g., Roemer, 1996; forthcoming).
15Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2005)
19We conclude by brieﬂy relating our analysis of the Harsanyi veil of igno-
rance to the recent literature that we cited in the Introduction. We reiterate
our central point: we have completed the Harsanyi veil-of-ignorance model
by appending two things: information on interpersonal comparability —to be
thought of as a fact about the world— and an axiom, relating the IO’s vNM
preference order on lotteries on extended prospects to this information. Our
proposal might appear to be similar to the proposal of Karni (1998) which,
besides accepting the principle of acceptance, formulates an axiom of impar-
tiality on the IO preferences. Karni claims this axiom ‘renders meaningful
interpersonal comparisons of variation in ordinal welfare’.16 Karni (1988)
obtains a representation theorem for the IO preferences, in a more general
framework than ours, whose utility function is similar in form to what we






The preferences on extended prospects represented by U∗ are the same
as the preferences represented by U in our Theorem 1 if and only if:
(a) all individuals derive equal welfare from zero wealth, and
( b )a l li n d i v i d u a l sd e r i v ee q u a lw e l f a r ef r o mr e c e i v i n gt h ee n t i r ew e a l t h
of the society.
In our environments, this is clearly a singular case. Now U∗ clearly sat-
isﬁes the principle of acceptance. Therefore, by our Theorem 1, it is the
generically true that U∗ violates the principle of neutrality, on our environ-
ments. That is, when interpersonal comparability is meaningful (i.e., the or-
der R exists) Karni’s impartial observer will not generally rank two extended
prospects as equally desirable if the individuals in them receive equal welfare.
We consider this an undesirable feature of Karni’s approach. From our view-
point, Karni’s IO is ‘partial’ in the sense that he must generally bring other
16See also Karni (2003).
17Karni works on a more general space of states of the world: we have here specialized
his result to our environments, where the states are wealth distributions, and individual
vNM utility functions on wealth are assumed to be strictly increasing.
20considerations than ‘welfare’ to bear in deciding between extended prospects.
Dhillon and Mertens (1999) and Segal (2000) also derive preferences for
the IO which, in our environment, specialize to the representation U∗ above.
They do not, however, claim that interpersonal comparisons can be made
in their worlds, and so we cannot levy against their models the criticism we
have just made of Karni’s.
As our concern in this paper has been to explore the relationship of the veil
of ignorance to prioritarianism, and since the concept of priority assumes that
interpersonal comparisons are possible, those comparisons must be possible
in our formulation of the problem. We did not, however, argue that adding
such information is the only way to complete Harsanyi’s approach, although,
it need hardly be said, we ﬁnd it a compelling one.
5A p p e n d i x
We provide in this Appendix the proofs of the theorems in Section 2.
P r o o fo ft h e“ i fp a r t ”i nT h e o r e m1
Suppose ﬁrst that individuals in the world {v1,v 2,...,vn,W,R} are risk
isomorphic. Let U be the vNM utility function on extended prospects deﬁned
as in (5). Clearly, acceptance holds: for each i, U(i,·) is a positive aﬃne
transformation of vi. We also show that neutrality holds.





i=1 be two equal-welfare distributions of wealth such that
Wi
b >W i
a. We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: Wi
a ≤ W ≤ Wi
b


































21Case 2: W<W i
a <W i
b













































































Suppose now that (i,W)b R(j,W 0),w h e r eb R i st h es t r i c tp a r to ft h eo r d e r
R.D e ﬁne W∗ by (i,W ∗)I(j,W 0),i . e . ,W∗ = σi
j(W0). We now know that
U(i,W ∗)=U(j,W0).B u t s i n c e vi(W) >v i(W∗), substitution into the
deﬁnition of U(i,W) immediately shows that U(i,W) >U (j,W 0) which
shows that neutrality holds.
If we take two other equal-welfare wealth distributions from the ones
chosen here, call them {c Wi
a} and {c Wi
b}, the new function, call it b U,t h e r e b y
deﬁned, is an aﬃne transformation of the function U. To see this, six diﬀerent
cases need to be analyzed. We only show one. The remaining cases are
analogous.
Case 1: Wi
a < c Wi
a < c Wi
b <W i
b





















b U(i,W)=k · U(i,W) − c,
where k = 1
p−q and c =
1−p
p−q.
T h u s ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h e r ei sav N Mp r e f e r e n c eo r d e r i n go ne x t e n d e d
prospects for the IO that is well-deﬁned, independent of the choice of equal-
welfare wealth distributions, and that satisﬁes acceptance and neutrality.
We show now that the order is unique. Assume there exists another order
that satisﬁes the principles of acceptance and neutrality. By acceptance, this
new order should be represented by a vNM utility function b U satisfying





i=1 be two equal-welfare distributions of wealth.
Then, by neutrality, there exist two numbers Ka and Kb such that
Ka = αi · v
i(W
i
a)+βi and Kb = αi · v
i(W
i












b U(i,W)=αi · v
i(W)+βi =( Kb − Ka) · U(i,W)+Ka,
which says that b U an aﬃne transformation of the function U.
P r o o fo ft h e“ o n l yi fp a r t ”i nT h e o r e m1
Suppose now that risk isomorphism does not hold. Then, there exist three


























































Now, if a vNM preference order on lotteries on extended prospects sat-






k) for all i,j =1 ,...,n and for all k = a,b,c.
By acceptance, there exist positive numbers αi and numbers β
i and numbers
















i for all i.












P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2





i=1 be two equal-welfare distributions of wealth such that Wi
b >W i
a.
Let S = {ω =( W1,...,W n):
Pn
i=1 Wi = W}. W ed e n o t eb yΩ the set of
allocations selected by the basic procedure (6), i.e.,

















Fix k ∈ {1,...,n} and consider the set:















i(Wi) denotes the wealth that k requires to reach the same level of
welfare as i achieves with wealth Wi.D e n o t e b y b Ω the set of allocations








· ωk : ωk ∈ Ωk
)
,
Claim. Ω = Ωk for all k ∈ {1,...,n}.
Proof of the claim. Denote generically ω =( W1,...,W n) and ﬁx k ∈
{1,...,n}.B y d e ﬁnition, (i,W i)I(k,σk
i(Wi)) for all i = {1,...,n}.N o w ,b y











b ) − vk(Wk
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b ) − vk(Wk
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b ) − vk(Wk
a)
> 0.













i(Wi)). In other words, ω ∈ Ω ⇐⇒ ω ∈ Ωk.T h i s
proves the claim.
Case 1: Ω is a singleton set.
If Ω = {ω} then, by the claim, Ω = {ω} = Ωk for all k,a n dt h e r e f o r e
b Ω = {ω} = Ω. In other words, the general procedure described in (8) would
select a unique allocation of wealth that would coincide with the allocation
selected by maximizing the utility function in (5).
Case 2: Ω is not a singleton set.
It is straightforward to show that Ω ⊆ b Ω.18 T h ec o n v e r s ei n c l u s i o ni s
also true, provided that we assume all individual vNM utility functions are




25concave. Formally, let ω ∈ b Ω. Then, ω = 1
n ·
Pn
k=1 ωk,f o rs o m eωk ∈ Ωk.
Since Ω = Ωk for all k =1 ,...,n,t h e nωk ∈ Ω for all k =1 ,...,n.N o w ,i fa l l
individual vNM utility functions are concave, it follows that Ω is a convex
set and therefore ω ∈ Ω.19
19Note that, had we deﬁned the general procedure (8) by selecting any convex combina-
tion (not necessarily with equal weights).of the wealth distributions maximizing (7), the
theorem would also hold.
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